Tuesday, 8 September 2026

Brussels quietly abandons revolutionary congestion pricing programme

 Background

Belgium is a federation of three highly autonomous regions. Since 2016 it has operated Viapass, a nationwide heavy-vehicle distance-, weight- and emissions-based road user charge for trucks over 3.5 tonnes. Viapass is run jointly by the three regions rather than the federal government; pricing and network coverage vary by region (all roads in Brussels; selected roads in Flanders and Wallonia). It replaced Belgium’s participation in the Eurovignette system, which charged trucks of 12 tonnes and over for time-based access to main highways across participating countries. Viapass is a great success. Six companies offer accounts and the necessary equipment for trucks using the charged network. It is mandatory for trucks registered in Belgium and all those visiting it.  Brussels charges trucks more for using local roads compared to the motorways.  The rate structure is here

For light vehicles, distance-based charging has seen little progress. Fuel duty sits at €0.60 per litre. Registration fees remain high. Brussels attempted to change this with SmartMove, a pilot project designed to cut high annual vehicle registration fees and replace them with a distance-based charge that also varied by time of day and location within the Brussels Capital Region.

The aim was to shift taxation from ownership to use, cut congestion and emissions, and encourage modal shift.



I wrote back in 2020 about it and again in 2021. This was a system, piloted in 2021 designed to replace the high annual vehicle registration fees for light vehicles in Brussels, with a distance based charge, which would vary by time of day.  

I said it was interesting for three reasons:

1. It is the latest attempt to introduce distance-based RUC for light-vehicles in Europe, replacing an existing tax. (Since then Iceland has done so, for all vehicles, but on a vehicle class basis distance fee, not one that varies by location and time of day)

2. It seeks to combine RUC with a form of congestion charging, by varying distance by time of day and location. The time of day factor is intended to charge higher rates for peak time travel, and the location factor being that only distance travelled within the Brussels Capital-Region would be subject to a fee.

3. Smartmove intends to pioneer using smartphones as a means of identifying and measuring vehicle trips. This has not been successful elsewhere to date, primarily because of the difficulties in ensuring that the phone is always linked to the vehicle, and the vehicle always has a smartphone operating to measure and report trip data. 

The project had several key objectives. Reduction of congestion, reduction of emissions, encouraging modal shift and shift motor vehicle taxation from ownership to usage.

Deloitte led key elements: designing and building the smartphone app prototypes for large-scale testing; developing gamification and “nudging” tools to encourage shifts to public transport; and creating the public campaign and website.  Unfortunately, all of this has disappeared (although the Wayback Machine is always our friend).


Part of the former SmartMove website


Proposed Brussels area for distance charging

Registration fees in Brussels start at €79–€6,358 for initial registration, with annual road tax ranging from €107 to around €4,000. Reducing these fixed costs while introducing a usage charge would have made car ownership more accessible, giving flexibility to own a vehicle while raising the cost of peak-time driving. 

Modelling by Transport and Mobility Leuven (reports in French and Dutch) indicated that full implementation could cut total kilometres driven in Brussels by 12% on an average working day, 18% in the evening peak, and delays by 30%. Even after cutting registration fees, the scheme was projected to generate an additional €250 million a year, partly from visiting vehicles.

Some of the benefits modelled for SmartMove were:
  • €54.1m per annum in economic benefits for all of Belgium
  • €11.4m per annum in health benefits (mainly from more active travel and the subsequent health benefits)
  • €10.6m per annum in reduced accident costs
  • €9.8m per annum in reduced emission costs
The project noted that on an average weekday, around half of all light vehicles driven in Brussels are not registered in Brussels. Pricing those vehicles alongside local ones would be essential to reducing congestion.  Notable, the average car trip length in Brussels is only 6km. 

Why was SmartMove potentially revolutionary?

SmartMove would have been pioneering. Unlike Singapore’s evolving GNSS-based ERP 2.0, it relied on ubiquitous consumer smartphones rather than dedicated on-board units or OEM telematics. With the ability to price by distance, location, time of day and vehicle type (lower rates for EVs and micro-cars, higher for larger ICE vehicles and SUVs), it could have differentiated arterial routes from local streets and applied fine-grained peak pricing. The app was also intended as a broader Mobility-as-a-Service platform offering journey planning, pricing and ticketing for alternatives to driving.

SmartMove could have been the most highly evolved road pricing system anywhere. 

By using mobile phones, it was a significant shift from concepts involving bespoke equipment being installed in vehicles, or accessing OEM telematics, to a consumer product that is almost ubiquitous – smartphones. Technology that hardly anyone in either the Intelligent Transport System or transport planning community anticipated.

SmartMove website sales pitch

What happened?

The test phase began in August 2020 with 100 Brussels Transport Authority employees, expanding in September to 2,000 citizens. The pilot costed the Brussels government €24.8 million and it ran through the pandemic, being extended to June 2022. €51 million EU grant toward a total estimated implementation cost of €68 million), ran through the pandemic and was extended to June 2022.

The app showed participants what they would have paid under the new system versus existing fees and awarded points (with real value) for driving less at peak times or switching modes. Because no real money changed hands, the trial mainly tested technical feasibility and user appeal. Preparation for full rollout included purchasing ANPR cameras in 2022 to match vehicles to accounts and fine those without an active app. Forgetting a phone, a dead battery or app failure would have risked a fine—an obvious practical weakness.

Opposition and cancellation

Perhaps the biggest critics, and understandably so, were residents (and politicians) from neighbouring Belgian states. Belgium is a federation, with Brussels being one of the three constituent states. If Brussels implemented SmartMove it would have granted Brussels residents a significant cut in vehicle registration fees in exchange for paying the charge.  However, owners of vehicles registered in Wallonia or Flanders that commute into Brussels would face the charge, without any such reduction. After all, the other states would not get any revenue from it, so it would effectively be a charge on non-residents driving into Brussels. Legally, Brussels was required to implement it on a co-operative approach with the other states, and it was likely that had it proceeded it would face a legal challenge, constitutionally, due to their opposition. 

However, it was opposition in Brussels that saw the programme fail, and the main reason was that it was seen as being anti-car, anti-motorist and was (wrongly) interpreted as being alongside a whole package of other measures (called GoodMove) which were designed to make driving slower (for safety), more difficult (by reallocating road space to other modes and reducing on street parking), and less attractive. 

The changes to the Brussels Government, following the June 2024 election and over 600 days of coalition negotiations, were the death knell of the project. The coalition government is now led by the Reformist movement - the centre right liberal French-speaking party, in coalition with five others. The length of those negotiations indicated how fraught they were, and anti-car measures have been cancelled as a result.

On top of making driving slower and more difficult, there was opposition to the cost, and with the possibly of legal challenges from the other states, it was easy to cancel. Furthermore, actual support for the proposal was muted. A key reason for this was the emphasis on implement road pricing to reduce emissions and encourage changes in behaviour, rather than seeing it as a measure to reform the taxation of motor vehicles in a way that would reduce congestion.

Motorists are more likely to support congestion pricing if other charges are cut, and if it can be proven to reduce congestion.  They are less likely to do so if it is seen as a tool to "correct" them, as if they are themselves failing by how they choose to get around, and they are especially less likely to do so if it is just seen as a new tax, with little benefit (unless you stop driving). 

That’s unfortunate, because it could have been recast as a project to make driving more accessible and efficient with lower fixed fees, but better mobility at peak times. By primarily being a redesign of the tax system around motor vehicles, it could have been seen as improving fairness. Poorer people, single parents or pensioners who use cars to access employment on the urban periphery, or social services, or visit family and friends could have had lower costs of travel with lower registration fees.

What can be learned?

Leaving aside the constitutional issues, as it was bold to even think it could have been plausible to tax motorists from outside Brussels, while only compensating those within, the main mistake in Brussels was seeking to do too much in one step and to not sell it as being primarily about making motoring taxes fairer.

It is always a big deal to convince people that paying more to drive reduces congestion, but to do so without being able to convince people they would also save a lot of money from owning a car was difficult. Emission reductions are good of course, as is making public transport (especially buses) move more freely and improving the urban environment altogether, but it needs to be about the people most directly affected - the motorists. While there were some efforts made to sell congestion reduction benefits to business, these were overwhelmed by concern about the cost.

The app concept was a challenge, as it presented the risk that if you forgot your phone or it did not work, you would be fined for not paying. That should not have been the only way to interact with the system as it risked mistakes being punished.

Options of paying a flat fee for driving per day would have been easier to understand, and not hard to implement without it being punitive. The app could have been one option alongside a more blunt ANPR based scheme. 

So there was a failure in policy, driven in part by technologists wanting their solution to be all encompassing. Most of all there is a failure to communicate enough to motorists and design a policy that can be acceptable to them. Furthermore to do this alongside a whole host of other measures to make driving more difficult makes the main objective look like it is anti-car.  Despite the best efforts of some transport planners and politicians, perhaps the biggest lesson in the past few years politically is that the public don't like being told that what they do is wrong and they need to be corrected.

Other jurisdictions have proven that distance based road user charging can be implemented for private car owners and be acceptable, as long as it replaces another tax very clearly and transparently. Others have proven that congestion pricing can be implemented if it makes driving for those paying easier, more reliable and faster.

Unfortunately, the Brussels Government and the SmartMove programme can join the list of cities that nearly implemented congestion pricing, and help inform those who might actually do it.

Friday, 4 September 2026

Romania to be the next country to implement heavy vehicle road user charging

Following on from the Netherlands on 1 July, Romania will become the 15th European country to launch a distance based road user charging system (truck toll in European parlance), using GNSS technology. It becomes the 16th full country worldwide to have heavy vehicle RUC and the 20th jurisdiction globally to introduce such a system (bearing in mind I am counting the nationwide DSRC based toll systems in Austria and Slovenia in this count, as they are priced by distance across the national highway networks).

TollRo as it is branded is expected to be launched on 1 October (this is a second delay from 1 July and 1 January) and will effectively mean heavy vehicle RUC systems will apply from the Low Countries at the English Channel (Belgium/Netherlands) all the way through central and eastern Europe to the Greek border, and the borders of the former USSR (Belarus, Ukraine, Moldova).  TollRo will be the responsibility of CNAIR.

CNAIR is the National Company for Road Infrastructure Administration.

It applies to travel on all motorways (“A” roads), expressways (“DE” roads) and national roads (“DN” roads). This covers over 18,100km of roads (around 29,000 miles).

TollRo will apply to all heavy vehicles with a registered gross vehicle weight of more than 3.5 tonnes.  It will replace Romania’s vignette system for those vehicles (although the vignette will remain for light vehicles). The rates for the vignette (essentially a time based pass for those unfamiliar) are below

Category

Vehicle type

Validity

RON

US$

C

Goods vehicle 3.5 t–7.5 t

1 day

20.39

$4.00

C

Goods vehicle 3.5 t–7.5 t

7 days

81.54

$16.00

C

Goods vehicle 3.5 t–7.5 t

30 days

163.08

$32.00

C

Goods vehicle 3.5 t–7.5 t

12 months

1,630.82

$320.00

D

Goods vehicle 7.5 t–12 t

1 day

35.67

$7.00

D

Goods vehicle 7.5 t–12 t

7 days

142.70

$28.00

D

Goods vehicle 7.5 t–12 t

30 days

285.39

$56.00

D

Goods vehicle 7.5 t–12 t

12 months

2,853.93

$560.00

E

Goods vehicle ≥12 t, up to 3 axles

1 day

45.87

$9.00

E

Goods vehicle ≥12 t, up to 3 axles

7 days

183.47

$36.00

E

Goods vehicle ≥12 t, up to 3 axles

30 days

366.93

$72.00

E

Goods vehicle ≥12 t, up to 3 axles

12 months

3,669.34

$720.00

F

Goods vehicle ≥12 t, 4 or more axles

1 day

56.06

$11.00

F

Goods vehicle ≥12 t, 4 or more axles

7 days

280.30

$55.00

F

Goods vehicle ≥12 t, 4 or more axles

30 days

616.65

$121.00

F

Goods vehicle ≥12 t, 4 or more axles

12 months

6,166.52

$1,210.00

Charges will be based on:

Distance travelled;

Vehicle weight category;

Road type (different rates for motorways compared to national highways); and

Emissions class.

Vehicle owners will have two initial choices to comply with the system:

Account with a telematics provider (typically supplying a GNSS enabled on-board unit)

Pre-declared single trip route ticket

To enable interoperability between account managers for toll and RUC systems across Europe into Romania, it has set up an organisation called Serviciul European de Taxare Rutieră Electronică (RoSETRE). It is essentially the European Electronic Tolling System platform for Romania. This will enable existing providers in neighbouring countries to sign up to be certified to operate in Romania, so that, for example, a Hungarian registered truck using a service provider for the Hungarian HuGO system, could use that very system and the account for that system to pay Romania’s charges.  

The rates for motorways and expressways are as follows (per kilometre in Romanian Leu):

 

Vehicle Mass

Euro 6

Euro 5

Euro 4

Euro 3

Euro ≤2

3.5 t - 12 t

0.31

0.38

0.43

0.52

0.61

Over 12 t

0.42

0.49

0.56

0.69

0.81

 

Lower rates apply for “main national roads” presumably reflecting the lower level of service

 

Vehicle Mass

Euro 6

Euro 5

Euro 4

Euro 3

Euro ≤2

3.5 t - 12 t

0.25

0.30

0.35

0.43

0.49

Over 12 t

0.32

0.39

0.45

0.56

0.62

 

For US readers, the rates in US$ per mile are below

 

Motorways and expressways — approximate charges in US$ per mile

Vehicle Mass

Euro 6

Euro 5

Euro 4

Euro 3

Euro ≤2

3.5 t - 12 t

$0.111

$0.136

$0.154

$0.186

$0.218

Over 12 t

$0.150

$0.175

$0.200

$0.247

$0.290

 

Main national roads — approximate charges in US$ per mile

Vehicle Mass

Euro 6

Euro 5

Euro 4

Euro 3

Euro ≤2

3.5 t - 12 t

$0.089

$0.107

$0.125

$0.154

$0.175

Over 12 t

$0.114

$0.140

$0.161

$0.200

$0.222


Seven providers are apparently registered to be account managers for the Romanian system. I'll provide more details once it is up and running (and hopefully it won't be delayed for a third time)!


Wednesday, 26 August 2026

Auckland Council to consult on congestion pricing

Long time readers will know I have followed (and worked) on Auckland congestion pricing studies for some time.  Most recently two big steps have been taken to advance the idea, noting it is labelled "Time of Use" road charging in New Zealand (just to add to the colourful vernacular in road pricing):

Incredibly, the Land Transport Management (Time of Use Charging) Amendment Bill was passed unanimously in the New Zealand Parliament, by all six parties. 

Auckland Council has voted to proceed with consultation on three time-of-use road pricing (congestion pricing) options for Auckland City later this year. 

There was extensive debate about whether to include in consultation an option of the public being able to reject road pricing altogether, but the amendment to do this did not proceed, so the consultation is not the end of the process.  Curiously, long standing City Councillor, Maurice Williamson (who was a Minister of Transport in the 1990s and a long advocate of road pricing) wanted the option of the public to say "no" because he said he had a record of pushing through unpopular policies before.  However, the consultation will simply focus on what the public thinks of the three options.  The process is depicted below. As you can say, once feedback is received on the options, Council will vote on which, if any, of the three options, it will support through to Scheme Initiation.

Scheme Initiation requires a Scheme Board to be set up jointly with central government, which will then commission the more detailed work.  That Board will finalise the detailed proposal, obtain public input and require approval of Council and then the Transport Minister to be proceed. The current schedule assumes approval will be finalised in mid 2028, with implementation no earlier than 2030.  That means there is plenty of work yet to do.

The options are:

City centre cordon

City centre and fringe cordon

Core motorways with cordon (either 1A or 1C)


The common elements to all proposals are:

  • AM peak charges in one direction, PM peak charges in the other direction
  • Shoulder charges so that rates rise and decline either side of the peak
  • No interpeak charges

City centre cordon

The city centre cordon concept sees an AM peak charge of NZ$3-NZ$4 and PM charge of NZ$2-$3. It would charge around 3.1% of all morning peak car trips, but 23% of trips would see some saving in time. It would reduce car trips by 0.8% and speeds increased by 1.0-2.4% region wide on average (although clearly it would be much higher closer to the cordon and lower in outer suburbs), with a reduction in region wide congestion of 2-4%.  The estimate is that those paying will save four minutes on average. 

It has the following key advantages:

Most passenger (unlike freight) trips are modally substitutable either by PT or active modes

Exclusion of the hospital (and Port)

Through trips are excluded (which are much less easily substitutable by PT).

However, it has very limited impact. Beyond approach routes into the city centre, it is unlikely that there would be much effect noticed on congestion. While there may be some easing of congestion through the Central Motorway Junction, it is unclear how sustainable that would be as it may attract more through traffic through the centre. It would also encourage some degree of “park and ride” or “park and walk” activity near its fringe, making car parking in Newmarket and Ponsonby significantly more valuable simple because of where the cordon is drawn.

Even those who pay may not notice much improvement, because so much congestion is on motorway and arterial routes far from the downtown cordon, so the benefits of paying to drive in the peaks might be perceived as poor value. The benefits at the city end would be noticeable, but if drivers remain on largely slow roads such as Onewa Road or the Northwestern Motorway for long periods, it may suffer from perceptions of whether it was worth it.

Maybe it is good as a first step, to demonstrate it has some impact, but it is hardly worth being the major scheme.

City centre and fringe cordon

The city centre and fringe cordon has more merit as it captures more trips, including Newmarket, Newtown, Ponsonby and Parnell (there is ambiguity about this). This is likely to have more notable impacts on trips on all arterials and motorways approaching the city.  It might be somewhat trivial, but as the “middle” option, I am betting this is the one most likely to be advanced. It moves the “park and ride” issue further out, more into suburban areas (so there will be a need for more residents’ parking or on-road parking restrictions in neighbouring suburbs).  

It is notable that this proposal has much higher charges in the AM peak ($5-$6), with $2-$3 in the PM peak, so it is unclear how much of the higher benefits is a function of price, not scheme design.  It sees 5.1% of AM peak car traffic charged, with a 1.4% reduction in region wide car traffic. The effect is a 1.0-4.1% increase in region wide traffic speeds (again it seems the averaging will see little impact beyond the Isthmus approach corridors). This represents a 3-6% reduction in congestion across the region.  Those paying are estimated to save five minutes on average.

A big issue is inclusion of the hospital, which either can be ignored (as peak only charges do not affect many users), or some discount or subsidy can be offered to vulnerable users with appointments. That would add some costs and require careful design (I recall designing and modelling such an option for Manchester). 

Overall, it would demonstrate noticeable benefits for the inner isthmus and even roads approaching the Northern Motorway from the lower North Shore but could only be seen as a first step.  The inner motorways would benefit with the reduction in trips using them, but it seems likely this would not be sustainable, as the Central Motorway Junction would gain an uplift in level of service compared to the Western Ring Road, which may attract a transfer of vehicles to take advantage of the (uncharged) time saving. 

Core motorways with cordon

Core motorways with cordon is easily the most superior option from the perspective of congestion reduction. Noting it could be included with either of the cordon options above. 

The charge would indicatively cover the Northern Motorway (SH1) from the Harbour Bridge south along the Southern Motorway to the Mt Wellington Interchange, and along the Northwestern Motorway (SH16) to the Waterview Interchange, alongside a cordon.  The proposal is for peak direction charging on the motorways, although this could be bi-directional.  $5 is proposed for the AM peak to access the motorway and the cordon. 

The effect is to target 6.9% of car trips in Auckland, reducing car trips by 2% (it is notable that this isn’t a significant increase on the city centre and fringe cordon). It increases regionwide speeds by 4-6%, reducing congestion by 13%. There would be a 9-12 minute time saving on motorways, with a 5 minute saving crossing the cordon (it is not clear if the savings accumulate for those driving on the motorway to cross the cordon). This is significant, but indicates that this option crosses the tipping point where traffic conditions break down, and relieves traffic volumes enough to allow a much more efficient flow of traffic. While 93% of car trips across the region in the peak are not charged, 31% are expected to benefit. Unfortunately, because the option includes no options to prevent rat-running off the motorways, it also predicts 12% would experience minor delays due to diversion.

That point is worth noting only because the option has been developed rather simplistically, when it is technically possible to capture rat running with appropriate sets of number plate camera (ANPR) to deter drivers from leaving the motorway to avoid the charge then using local roads to go past a motorway offramp point. Detailed traffic modelling should be used to ensure this can be addressed.

However, it is clear this option is the one with the most merit in transport policy terms. It has the attraction of being able to be tailored more finely for the conditions on each of the three motorways. It shouldn’t be the same fee on each route in each direction, and at a later stage there are merits in extending charge times on corridors that have enduring congestion – notably the Southern Motorway between Greenlane and Mt Wellington. 

Are there better options?

This will be a source of some debate.  

Double cordon?

One considered was a double cordon on the Isthmus, which is a bad idea.  The proposal below was sourced from the Options Assessment and Policy Framework report (PDF)


Besides the downtown, it added an inner cordon, which would still exempt through trips on the motorway, but charge anyone entering either of the cordons in peak times (so those within the outer cordon would still be charged to enter the inner one). Although it has some positive impacts, this is offset by the blunt impact of having a cordon cutting through residential areas, separating homes from schools, parks, shops and other local amenities for no other reason that the convenience of a traffic engineer drawing the line. It is quite unlike the city centre, which is bounded by the Central Motorway Junction, Grafton Gully and the harbour. 

Cordons are effective and avoid serious distortions if there are natural geographic or large scale artificial boundaries which a cordon can be placed onto. Stockholm has much of this, London not so much, but the very low proportion of car trips taken in inner London saw the distortions being very minor indeed.  Cordons are for the sake of simplicity and ease of understanding. However, cordons through suburban residential areas have considerable scope to create distortions. Gothenburg experienced this in the northern suburb of Backa, where the cordon literally splits the suburb in two.  This meant that local residents, notably elderly ones, driving from their homes to local amenities faced the same fee as those driving into the central city. Technology has been implemented so that only people driving from outside Gothenburg are charged when passing the cordon that runs through Backa (the Backa exemption). The scale of Auckland, which is much larger than Gothenburg, means that a cordon beyond the city centre would mean residents literally charged for taking cars one block, or charged to take children to one school but not another nearby.  

I am pleased this option has been rejected, and I fear the city centre and fringe cordon might present some similar issues, but this is about as far as any cordon should go in Auckland

Motorway hotspots

Another option that was rejected was pricing targeted motorway hotspots. 

The concept was to price the most congested parts of the network, effectively creating a pilot scheme that could demonstrate the benefits of time-of-use pricing before a wider rollout. While it was never intended as the end-state for Auckland, it could have delivered valuable evidence and public familiarity with road pricing. Unfortunately, I think the option was short-changed by the way it was designed and assessed.

First, no effort was made to mitigate rat-running around charging points. ANPR systems can identify vehicles that leave a motorway immediately before a charging point and rejoin shortly afterwards. Charges can then be applied only to those passing both camera locations, while legitimate exiting traffic remains exempt. The Backa exemption in Gothenburg demonstrates that this is both feasible and established practice. Ruling out motorway hotspot charging partly because of diversion impacts, without incorporating available mitigation measures, risks understating its potential benefits.

Second, modelling behavioural responses remains inherently crude. This is not a criticism of the modellers; it reflects the difficulty of estimating how many people might:

  • travel four rather than five days a week;
  • shift travel by an hour or two; or
  • combine trips more efficiently.

Motorway hotspot charging is likely to rely more on changes in travel timing and frequency than on mode shift, although expanding alternative transport options remains important. The most obvious gap is the absence of the Northwestern Busway, although the corridor already benefits from bus lanes and could support significantly enhanced services.

Finally, the assessment framework appears to favour options with the largest region-wide impacts. That is understandable, but smaller-scale interventions will inevitably produce more localised benefits. Singapore's Electronic Road Pricing system evolved through precisely this approach, targeting specific congestion points and expanding over time. Rather than attempting to solve congestion everywhere simultaneously, it focused on maintaining traffic flow where congestion was most severe.


Too often in the report materials Singapore is depicted more as the Area Licensing Scheme from 1975 (which was a small cordon with manual enforcement of paper based permits) rather than the Electronic Road Pricing system which evolved from 1995 onwards.

Singapore ERP charging points

Auckland could trial a small number of motorway segments with simple, targeted pricing designed to improve traffic flow on those corridors. Such an approach would not transform the entire network, but it might deliver visible results and prove easier to gain public acceptance for than a larger and more comprehensive scheme.

Distance based option

20 years ago, the UK Department for Transport was funding local authorities to develop congestion pricing schemes that would leap ahead of the level of sophistication of the London Congestion Charge (which wouldn't be hard). One way it was going to do this was to fund piloting an option for motorists to pay by distance, time of day and location, rather than just time of day and location, by allowing those who want to, to use in-vehicle technology to measure distance at peak times only, on specific roads identified beyond specific boundaries.

In the New Zealand context this could mean that subscribers to any of the three existing electronic road user charging (eRUC) providers could be charged directly, not based on entering a cordon or a motorway as a flat fee, but by kilometre and have that be at a much lower rate until the fee accumulated to the full charge. The ability to do this has not been explored at all to date, but once the Land Transport (Revenue) Amendment Bill passes, there may be more scope for new entrants into the eRUC market to offer an option to customers to not just pay RUC automatically, but to pay on a different basis to the blunt single charge approach anticipated.

I don't expect either time or budget permitted exploring this further, but it is definitely something that should be considered not just for commercial vehicle users, but any private motorists who wish to do so. e.g. it may be much cheaper to pay for a few kms of driving on a charged motorway in the AM peak than a single flat charge, and also more directly discourage rat running. 

Next steps

As public discussion expands, resistance is inevitable.

The Council debate revealed a vocal minority opposed to road pricing in principle, alongside a group of sceptics who remain open to persuasion. Those concerns are understandable. Road pricing is a new charge, and net revenues are expected to be reinvested in the transport system. Questions about whether that spending represents value for money, and whether those paying directly benefit, are legitimate and deserve answers.

What has been largely absent from the debate, however, is a clear discussion about the cost of congestion itself on a personal level, rather than the multi-billion dollar aggregate which most people cannot get their heads around.

No major city has successfully eliminated congestion by building its way out of the problem, whether through road expansion or investment in alternative modes alone. Managing demand is an essential part of the solution.

For Aucklanders, congestion means waking earlier, arriving home later, spending less time with family and leisure activities, and consuming more fuel or electricity. For businesses, it means fewer deliveries, fewer service calls, fewer meetings and lower productivity. Congestion makes the city less efficient, less prosperous and less liveable.

None of the options under consideration will eliminate congestion. They can, however, make the network function more efficiently, improve travel time reliability, encourage better use of alternative modes, and spread demand more evenly across the day.

That alone would be a worthwhile outcome.

Most importantly, momentum must not be lost. Progress to date has been slow, perhaps reflecting the complexity of joint decision-making between central and local government. If the proposals pass the next stage, careful public communication will be critical. The detailed design process must address genuine concerns while avoiding the misunderstandings that so often dominate debates about road pricing.

I look forward to the consultation beginning in November 2026.

What to do?

Clearly those who have strong views on congestion pricing in Auckland should participate in the consultation, but they should all read the documentation provided along with earlier reports (links above).  The likelihood that there will be a lot of public opposition is fairly reasonable and understandable, but what would be most productive is to get some indication of the options people dislike and like the most, and why. Besides helping to select the best option, it would also help to refine options and indicate concerns that perhaps haven't been explored sufficiently. There is also merit in understanding whether opponents will be affected directly or not, as well as those who will benefit.  What is almost invisible is that bus users at peak times are likely to benefit noticeably with less congestion, as long as buses are not overcrowded as well.

I'm a firm believer that pricing can be designed in a way that has significantly positive outcomes with negative outcomes that can be mitigated, with major city shaping effects. It is particularly important for those who see road pricing as a great tool to punish driving and treat motorists as "car fascists" (as a politician once quipped a few years ago) to end that sort of talk. Nothing will kill off road pricing more than it being dominated by people who want to treat driving as a malignant activity, and by default treat people's choices around where they live, work and play as needing "correction". That's not what the intention of the legislation is, and it is notable that a centre-right government in New Zealand has advanced this policy with the primary objective of easing gridlock, not raising money and not punishing driving.  If you can't convince the people that will have to pay that they can be better off from this, it isn't going to proceed, and if you seek to design it so they are not, then it definitely won't.